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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT DALE STRALEY,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Case No. 20010052-CA

:

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND
HANK GALETKA,
Respondents/Appellees.

NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION
Robert Straley appeals the trial court's order denying his request for extraordinary
relief and dismissing his petition brought pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65 B(b). This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2a-3(f)and (g) (2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley's due process rights were
met with regard to the Alienist's examination?

2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley was not entitled to either a
limited confidentiality warning, or a Miranda warning prior to the alienist's
interview?

3.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley's vague and conclusory

allegations regarding inaccuracies in the Utah Board of Pardon's (Board's)
file were not supported?
4.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley was provided the
information that he was entitled to?

5.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board has no obligation to
advise Straley as to his right to contest the accuracy of the information, or to
advise him as to his legal rights?

6.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board does not violate the
separation of powers clause?

7.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley does not have a right to
counsel at a parole grant hearing?

8.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board's decision was properly
made?

9.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted against respondent Galetka?

The standard of review for questions of constitutional law, State v. Martinez, 896
P.2d 38, 39 (Utah App. 1995), like all conclusions of law, is correctness. State v. Riggs,
1999 UT App 271,1f 7.
2

RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Any relevant statutes or rules will be quoted in the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history
Straley originally filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the Utah Court of
Appeals challenging various alleged constitutional violations involving an October 15,
1998 Board hearing. (R. 5-11, 298). A Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court, and the petition was transferred to the Seventh District Court. (R. 303).
On May 22, 2000, Straley's Motion to Amend the Petition was granted by the Seventh
District Court. (R. 306). The Seventh District Court found that "Counts" I, VIII, IX, X
and XII of Straley's amended petition were "frivolous on their face."1 (R. 303). The court
served a copy of the amended petition on the Board, ordering the Board to respond to the
remaining claims. (R. 304). The Seventh District Court subsequently granted the

'Count I alleged that Utah Code § 77-18-4 is unconstitutional. (R. 299). Count
VIII alleged Straley was not given credit for time served, thereby denying his equal
protection rights, his rights against Double Jeopardy, and that "crediting one for time
served is a core judicial function, and the board is an executive body." (F. 300). Count
IX alleged that the Board violates the speedy trial clause by determining actual
incarceration time. Id. Count X alleges Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional, and Count XII alleges the statutes governing the board are
unconstitutional as they deny the right to be heard. (R. 301).
3

Board's motion for a change of venue, transferring the amended petition to the Third
District Court, and allowing the Board an extra 15 days to "answer or otherwise respond
to those portions of the Amended Petition that were not summarily dismissed as being
frivolous on their face." (R. 324-25). Accordingly, neither the Board nor the Third
District Court addressed the claims found to be "frivolous."2 (R. 330, 491). The Board
filed a response to the limited amended petition in the form of a Motion to Dismiss (R.
327), which was granted with prejudice, as to the remaining "Counts:" II, III, IV, VI, VII,
XI, XIII, XIV and XV. (R. 491).
The Third District Court's Order indicates that after the Board's "Motion to
Dismiss" was filed Straley filed a second "Motion to Amend." Id

The Third District

Court held that this second "Amended Petition" included the same claims contained in the
first amended petition, including some dismissed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. The Third

2

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(5) provides that the court must review the petition and if "any
claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an
order dismissing the claim...." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(6) goes on to provide that as to those
petitions not dismissed as being frivolous on their face, that "the court shall direct the
clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the
respondent by mail." The court also "may issue an order directing the respondent to
answer or otherwise respond to the petition...." Pursuant to this rule, the Board was not
ordered to respond to the "counts" dismissed by the Seventh District Court.
4

District Court dismissed as "frivolous on its face," the only new allegation, "Count" III.3
Id. Straley's "Motion to Disqualify Judge Dever" was also denied. (R. 492).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley's due process rights were met
with regard to the Alienist's examination. Under both the federal constitution and
Utah's parole statues, there is no liberty interest in being paroled. See Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, & (1979); Houtz
v. DeLand, 718 F.Supp. 1497, 1502 (D. Utah 1989). Utah courts have held, however,
under the Utah Constitution that due process protections apply in limited parole
situations. Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993).
These limited situations include original parole grant hearings, or any parole hearing
where an inmate's release date is fixed or extended. See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909; Neel v.
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994). Due process in these limited instances
requires that an inmate know what information the Board will consider enough in
advance to allow the inmate a reasonable opportunity to respond to and/or rebut any
inaccuracies in that information. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909.
3

Count III of the second amended petition alleged that the Board's certificate of
service, indicating that the Board packet had been served on Straley, was inadequate. (R.
385).
5

Accordingly, where the Board considered the Alienist report, that information
must have been provided to Straley enough in advance for him to have had the
opportunity to respond to and/or rebut such. No allegation is made that any one of these
particularized due process requirements was not met here. The trial court correctly
concluded that Straley received all of the due process protections he was entitled to.
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley was not entitled to either a
limited confidentiality warning, or to a Miranda warning prior to the alienist's
interview. The Board ordered an Alienist's examination on Straley pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-7(3). This exam, conducted in the parole context, is neither criminal
nor "sentencing" in nature. See Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664,
668-70 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that in this context
the examination requires neither a Miranda warning nor a limited confidentiality warning.
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley's vague and conclusory
allegations regarding inaccuracies in the Board's file were not supported. The vast
majority of Straley's allegations regarding inaccurate Board information are vague and
conclusory. The only alleged inaccuracies pointed to with any particularity are Straley's
dissatisfaction with the diagnosis of "pedophilia" in his alienist report, and the exact
categorization of two of his prison disciplinaries. Straley alleges nothing proving that the
6

"pedophilia" diagnosis is false, and when the categorization error was brought to the
Board's attention, it was rectified. Moreover, irrespective of categorization, at the time
the Board made its decision Straley had two disciplinaries.
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley was provided the information
he was entitled to. Straley alleges that he did not have the opportunity to review his
Presentence Investigation Report at the time of sentencing, and that he was allowed to
"unconstitutionally waive his right to counsel" at Order to Show Cause hearings. Such
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C allegations are not appropriate under this Utah R. Civ. P. 65B
petition.
Straley also claims he was not provided a "laundry list" of information to which he
alleges he was entitled. The records do not support these allegations. The records show
that either Straley was provided with the information, that the Board's file did not include
the information, or that the information was included in Section 2 of the Board's file.
Section 2 contains materials not ordinarily provided to inmates due to its classification
under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), or due to its
nature as internal documentation. Any information in this section relied upon by the
Board is provided to the inmate in a summarized form.
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board has no obligation to advise
7

Straley as to his right to contest the accuracy of the information, or to advise him as
to his legal rights. Straley provides no substantiation for his one sentence allegations
regarding these issues. As this Court noted, it is "the inmate, therefore, rather than the
Board, [who] bears the burden of reviewing the file and requesting more time upon
discovering it lacks information the Board should consider." Peterson v. Utah Board of
Pardons, 931 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah App. 1997).
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board does not violate the
separation of powers clause. Whether the Board's exercise of its parole power violates
the separation of powers doctrine, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Padilla v.
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d at 669. Padilla held that a court's power to
sentence and the Board's power to pardon and parole "are two separate and distinct
powers, neither of which invades the province of the other." Id. at 669.
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley does not have a right to
counsel at a parole grant hearing. The Utah Supreme Court decided this issue in
Monson v. Carver, holding that the assistance of counsel is not required at parole grant
hearings. 928 P.2d 1017, 1103 (Utah 1996). In this context, counsel is only necessary to
protect due process rights afforded by article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id.
Straley alleges nothing indicating these due process rights were denied due to his lack of
8

counsel.
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board's decision was properly
made. The Board followed statutory requirements. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-272(2)(f), Michael Sibbett, the Board's chair, conducted Straley's hearing. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(c), a Board majority affirmed Mr. Sibbett's recommendation.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction resolve Straley's alleged
"irreconcilable" statutory conflict. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(d) prohibits a Board
member from holding any other office in state government, while Utah Code Ann. § 6325a-30, mandates that the chair of the Board must be a member of the Sentencing
Commission. Of the two, however, Section 63-25a-301 is the subsequently enacted
statute, which Utah law holds "generally supersede^] prior existing ones on the same
subject," where, as here, the two statutes appear to present an "irreconcilable conflict."
S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah 1998).
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted against respondent Galetka. Straley
alleges no cause of action against respondent Galetka, the Warden of the Utah State
Prison at the time. Moreover, the only other named respondent, the Board, is in no way
under Glaetka'a supervision. This case presents an analogous situation to that found in
9

Estes v. Van der Veur, where this Court dismissed an action against the Board, brought
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b), where the warden was the only named respondent, and he
could not provide the relief petitioned for. 824 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Utah 1992), cert
denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
STRALEY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE MET WITH REGARD
TO THE ALIENIST'S EXAMINATION.

Straley is incarcerated for sexual abuse of a child. (R. 348). Utah Code Ann. §
77-27-7(3) specifies that for this crime the Board must appoint one or more alienists to
examine the offender within six months of his original parole date hearing. Accordingly,
the Board ordered Straley's psychological evaluation, with the resulting alienist report
being submitted to the Board.
Straley argues that he was entitled to due process with regard to the administration
of this exam, i.e., notice of the date, the time and the purpose of the examination. Straley
bases this due process allegation on his assertion that he has a "liberty interest" in being
paroled, and that since the alienist's report impacts the Board's decision regarding such,
he has a due process right in the examination. Straley is mistaken. He has no "liberty
interest" in being paroled. The United States Supreme Court in Greenholtz v. Inmates of
10

the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, held that the Constitution does not confer
a liberty interest in parole. 442 U.S. at 7. Moreover, Utah's parole statutes do not
provide a liberty interest under the federal constitution in being paroled. Houtz, 718
F.Supp. at 1502. In fact, Utah parole statutes provide no "expectation of parole." Hatch
v. DeLand, 790 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah App. 1990).
Admittedly, Utah courts, have gone beyond federal mandates, holding that under
the Utah Constitution, in certain limited situations, due process applies to parole hearings.
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d at 909. These situations are limited
to original parole grant hearings, and parole hearings where "an inmate's release date is
fixed or extended." Id.;Neel, 886 P.2d at 1100. Only in these instances, does due
process require that an inmate know the information that the Board will consider, and that
he know enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to respond and rebut any
inaccuracies in that information. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909.
An alienist examination does not come under either of these limited situations.
The only due process required with regard to this report, is that where the Board
considered it in a parole hearing where a release date was fixed or extended, Straley must
have been provided a copy enough in advance to have had a reasonable opportunity to
prepare responses and/or rebuttal of inaccuracies. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909. No
11

allegations are made that any one of these procedural safeguards was not met as to this
report. The trial court correctly concluded that Straley received all of the due process he
was entitled to in this context.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
STRALEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EITHER A LIMITED
CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING, OR TO A MIRANDA WARNING
PRIOR TO THE ALIENIST'S INTERVIEW.

Straley confuses alienist reports ordered prior to sentencing with those ordered by
the Board. Board-ordered alienist reports are to "specifically address the question of the
offender's current mental condition and attitudes as they relate to any danger the offender
may pose to children or others if the offender is released on parole." Utah Code Ann. §
77-27-7(3). The alienist report in this parole context is for a noncriminal, nonsentencing
function. The rights attached to such a report are not the same as those required in the
criminal, sentencing context.
Straley, nevertheless, relies exclusively on criminal cases requiring a Miranda
warning prior to an alienist interview at the time prior to and/or at the time of sentencing.
See Estellev. Smith 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989). Once
again, however, parole is civil, not criminal in nature. Padilla, 947 P.2d at 670.
Moreover, the Board does not sentence. While a few early Utah court decisions may

12

have contained language equating the Board's power to pardon and parole with
sentencing, subsequent Utah decisions have unequivocally held that "[t]he power to
execute sentences remains in the exclusive control of the judiciary," and that the court's
power to sentence versus the
Board's power to pardon and parole "are two separate and distinct powers, neither of
which invades the province of the other." Padilla, 947 P.2d at 668-669. The trial court
correctly concluded that with regard to the alienist report, neither a Miranda nor limited
confidentiality warning is required in this noncriminal, nonsentencing parole context.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
STRALEY'S VAGUE AND CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS
REGARDING INACCURACIES IN THE BOARD'S FILE WERE
NOT SUPPORTED.

Straley alleges the Board's file, and in particular his alienist report, contains
inaccurate information. The majority of these allegations, however, are made in vague
and conclusory terms, seemingly addressing Straley's disgruntlement with the report,
rather than actual inaccuracies. The alleged inaccuracies pointed to with any particularity,
are first, Straley's allegation that the alienist's diagnosis of "pedophilia" is "clinically
impossible." See Straley's Brief, p. 14. This argument is somewhat incongruous
considering Straley admits he had sex with a twelve-year-old girl. (R. 400). He further
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argues that this diagnosis is being deleted from his Sex Offender Treatment plan at the
Utah State Prison (Prison). See Straley's Brief, p. 14.
First, on October 15, 1998, when the Board held its hearing, the Prison's purported
decision to delete this diagnosis had not yet occurred. See Addendum A, "Prison
Response"; (R.443). Second, even had this information appeared in the Board's file, a
purported variance of opinion as to whether a "pedophilia" diagnosis is appropriate, does
not prove the diagnosis is false. In such instances, the Board has the "right to rely on any
factors known . . . or later adduced . . . , and the weight to be afforded such factors in
deciding whether [a prospective probationer] pose(s) a societal risk...." Northern v.
Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993).
Straley also alleges errors in his disciplinary reports. He filed a prison grievance
regarding this error, and the Board's file contains a letter from the prison correcting such.
See Addendum B, "Letters from the Prison" (R. 369- 71). The fact remains, however,
that Straley had disciplinaries at the time the Board made its decision. Even though the
categorization of such may not have been exact, two disciplinaries would still have been
seen as aggravating factors by the Board. Moreover, the Board may have viewed
Straley's actual disciplinaries, "possession of contraband" and "the unauthorized use of
any vehicle, tool, device or object," as even more serious than the erroneous
14

categorization ones of "creating a health or safety hazard" and "failure to take medication
as prescribed."4
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
STRALEY WAS PROVIDED THE INFORMATION HE WAS
ENTITLED TO.

Straley alleges he did not have the opportunity to review his Presentence
Investigation Report at the time of sentencing, and that he was allowed to
"unconstitutionally waive his right to counsel" at Order to Show Cause hearings. These
allegations are not appropriate to a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B petition. They should be raised in
a Utah R. Civ. P. 65C petition, dealing with "the legality of the conviction or sentence."
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (c).
Straley also alleges that he was not provided with Mr. Sibbett's notes, Adult
Probation and Parole's (AP&P's) recommendation regarding his probation revocation, his
4

In Bukari v. Hutto, the Fourth Circuit held that to have a correctional file free
from allegedly false and prejudicial information a due process right may be invoked only
where the inmate alleges 1) certain information is in his file, 2) the information is false,
and 3) it is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. 487 F.Supp. 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1980). The third requirement is only met where two additional criteria are satisfied.
Id. at 1168. The adverse administrative action must be within the "ambit of the due
process clause," and the false information must be "significant and not merely technical
in nature." Id.
Using the 4th Circuit's analysis as to the "pedophilia" diagnosis, there is nothing
alleged proving the diagnosis is, in fact, "false." As to disciplinaries, the third
requirement is not met. The alleged inaccuracy is not significant in nature.
15

mental health and sex offender treatment reports, his inmate C-notes, his medical
information, or his disciplinary information, including information surrounding his
segregation. Addressing each of these in turn, first: the Board's file shows that Straley's
disclosure packet contained a copy of AP&P's recommendation, as well as copies of
information regarding his sex offender treatment.5 See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R.
379-81). Straley acknowledged receipt of his disclosure packet. See Addendum C,
"Acknowledgment"; (R.373). Second, C-notes from the prison are not included in the
Board's file, nor are quarterly mental health reports. See Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R.
379-81).
Admittedly, portions of Straley's disciplinary information, as well as Mr. Sibbett's
notes, were not provided him. The reason for this, is that this information is presently
filed in Section 2 of the Board's file. See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 379-81). This
section ordinarily contains information not provided inmates due to its classification
under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), and internal
documents not subject to disclosure under Labrum. If any information in this section is
5

The Board's file indicates what information has been provided to an inmate in his
disclosure packet by placing a blue sheet on top of the provided information which states,
"All Materials Below This Page Were Copied and A Disclosure Packet Prepared," with
the initials of the preparer and the date prepared. See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber.
(R. 379-81).
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relied on by the Board it is provided to the inmate in a summarized form. As noted
earlier, however, errors regarding the categorization of Straley's disciphnaries have been
corrected. See Addendum B, "Letters from the Prison"; (R. 369-71). Moreover, as also
previously addressed, this disciplinary error would have had little or no effect on the
Board's decision since it was a classification error, not an error as to the number of
disciphnaries.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
BOARD HAS NO OBLIGATION TO ADVISE STRALEY AS TO HIS
RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION,
NOR TO ADVISE HIM AS TO HIS LEGAL RIGHTS.

Straley's allegations regarding this issue are mere one sentence assertions, with no
substantiation. Moreover, as noted by this Court, it is "the inmate, therefore, rather than
the Board, [who] bears the burden of reviewing the file and requesting more time upon
discovering it lacks information the Board should consider." Peterson, 931 P.2d at 150.
Likewise, here, once the Board provided the information to Straley, he bears the burden
of bringing inaccuracies to the Board's attention. The Board also has no obligation to
advise petitioner as to his legal rights regarding the pursuit of further legal action.
Finally, none of the information that the Board's file indicated was provided to Straley,
was provided in a summarized form. See Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 379-81).
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
BOARD DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
CLAUSE.

Whether the Board's exercise of its parole power violates the separation of powers
doctrine, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons
and Parole, 947 P.2d at 669. In that case, Padilla, an inmate at the Utah State Prison,
sought extraordinary relief from the Board's actions in relation to his original parole grant
hearing. As here, he alleged that the Board's power to pardon and parole amounted to a
"sentencing" function, which is inherently judicial, and accordingly violated the
separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 666. The court labeled this argument "flawed,"
stating that a court's power to sentence, and the Board's power to pardon and parole "are
two separate and distinct powers, neither of which invades the province of the other." Id.
at 669.
While acknowledging under Utah's indeterminate sentencing that it is the Board
that sets the actual number of years a defendant will serve, the court unequivocally held,
"the Board's exercise of its parole power in setting determinate parole dates does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution."
Id. at 669. Padilla effectively disposes of Straley's allegations regarding this issue.

VII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
18

STRALEY DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A
PAROLE GRANT HEARING.
The issue of whether an inmate is constitutionally entitled to counsel at parol grant
hearings was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at
1103. The court held that the assistance of counsel is not required at these hearings,
since parole proceedings are not "criminal proceedings" to which the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches. Id. The Utah Supreme Court noted in Neel v. Holden, that the
right to counsel in a parole grant hearing would be necessary only where it "proceeded]
out of the due process rights afforded by article I, section 7 of the Utah constitution." 886
P.2d at 1103. Straley's only alleged justification for counsel is that an alienist report is
"extremely complex." (R. 400). Such reasoning would necessitate counsel any time an
alienist report is ordered. Due process does not require such.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
BOARD'S DECISION WAS PROPERLY MADE.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(2)(f) states,
[a]ny investigation, inquiry, or hearing that the board has authority
to undertake or hold may be conducted by any board member of an
examiner appointed by the board. When any of these actions are
approved and confirmed by the board and filed in its office, they are
considered to be the action of the board and have the same effect as if
originally made by the board.
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Pursuant to this statute, Straley's hearing was held before Michael A. Sibbett, the
Board's chair. Further, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(c), which
mandates that where, as here, an action is taken by other than a majority of the Board that
decision must be affirmed by a Board majority, a Board majority affirmed Mr. Sibbett's
recommendation. See Addendum D, "Hearing Worksheet6"; (R. 375).
Moreover, Straley misreads the Board's decision sheet. It states that it is the final
decision "of the hearing held on 10/15/1998." See Addendum E, "Decision Sheet";
(R.377). It does not state that the final decision was made on 10/15/1998. Id. The
Board's rational signed by Mr. Sibbett, was signed either after the day, or on the day that
other Board members signed their final decision. See Addendum D, "Hearing
Worksheet"; (R. 375).
Straley also argues that Mr. Sibbett, as chairman of the Board cannot be a member
of the Sentencing Committee. The basis for this argument is Utah Code Ann. § 77-272(d) which states, "[a] member of the board may not hold any other office in the
government of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county
government or municipal corporation within a state. A member may not engage in any
6

Four members of the Board initialed the worksheet, constituting a majority of the
Board. See Addendum D, "Hearing Worksheet"; (R. 375). (Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-27-2(1), the Board consists of five full-time members).
20

occupation or business inconsistent with his duties."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301(f), on the other hand, mandates that one of the
members of the Sentencing Commission shall be "the chair of the Board of Pardons and
Parole or a designee appointed by the chair." This apparent conflict is resolved by the
rules of statutory construction. The Utah Supreme Court states that, "subsequently
enacted statutes generally supersede prior existing ones on the same subject," where there
is "an irreconcilable conflict between the two. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d at 443. These two
statutes appear to present an "irreconcilable conflict." As such, the statute enacted first
supersedes the prior existing statute.
Here, Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301, dealing with the composition of the
Sentencing Commission, was enacted in 1993. Enacted 1993 Utah Laws ch. 77, § 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2, mandating that no board member hold office in the
government, was enacted in 1985. Enacted 1985, Utah Laws ch. 198, § 7. Therefore, the
Sentencing Commission statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301, supercedes Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-2, thereby allowing the chair of the Board to serve on the commission.
This statutory construction meets what appears to be policy concerns behind Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-2, i.e., the legislative desire to avoid any Board member having
partisan governmental connections, thereby assuring a totally nonpartisan body.
21

Membership on the Sentencing Commission, however, in no way jeopardizes a Board
member's nonpartisan standing. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-304, the purpose
of the commission is,
to develop guidelines and propose recommendations to the Legislature,
the governor, and the Judicial council about the sentencing and release
of juvenile and adult offenders in order to:
(1) respond to public comment;
(2) relate sentencing practices and correctional resources;
(3) increase equity in criminal sentencing;
(4) better define responsibility in criminal sentencing; and
(5) enhance the discretion of sentencing judges while preserving the
role of the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Youth Parole
Authority.
Nothing in Commission's stated purpose would jeopardize the nonpartisan nature of the
Board.7

IX.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
STRALEY FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST RESPONDENT
GALETKA.

The Commission also includes "two trial judges and an appellate judge" as well as
"two juvenile court judges," Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301(h)--(i), whose qualification
for office includes resigning "from any elective, non-judicial public office or political
party office which they may hold." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-102(l)(A). The
inclusion of the judiciary on the Commission speaks to the nonpartisan nature of that
body.
22

Straley names Hank Galetka, the Warden of the Utah State Prison at the time, as a
respondent. Straley, however, fails to allege any actions Galetka took in this matter to
harm him, or to violate any of his recognized legal rights. Moreover, Straley's other
named respondent, the Board, is in no way under Galetka's supervision.
This Court dealt with an analogous situation in Estes v. Van der Veur, where a
prisoner brought an action under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b), claiming that he was imprisoned
illegally due to a denial of due process by the Board of Pardons. 824 P.2d 1200 (Utah
App. 1992), cert denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). The only named respondent,
however, was the prison warden. This court affirmed the grant of the motion to dismiss,
explaining that the petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, since the warden could not provide the relief petitioned for. Id. at 1201.
Here, Galetka is also without authority to grant the relief Straley seeks.
Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that Straley fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted as to respondent Galetka.8
8

As noted earlier, the trial court dismissed as frivolous several of Straley's
"counts," which the Board was not ordered to respond to. The instant appeal is limited to
the trial court's order finding that those "counts" were "frivolous on their face." Straley
not only makes no showing that the trial court's determination of frivolousness is not
correct, he totally fails to address it. The trial court's "frivolous" determination as to
those counts is appealable, not the merits of the allegations. "It is well established that
this court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."
23

CONCLUSION
The trial court's order dismissing Straley' petition for extraordinary relief should
be affirmed. Because this case deals with claims addressed by established law, the Board
does not request oral argument or a published opinion.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

J

September 2001.

MARK A. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

SHAREL S. REBEI
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On l*[ September 2001,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two copies of
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:

Robert D. Straley
Inmate # 24725
State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15,28 (Utah App. 1996).
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P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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ADDENDUM A
"Prison Response"

LEVEL I GRIEVANCE
STAFF RESPONSE
UTAH STATE PRISON

GRIEVANCE NUMBER: 9908- 33- 342
INMATE NAME:

Robert Straley

INMATE NUMBER:

#24725

On December 15, 19991 met with your Sex Offender Treatment therapist and the clinical
Supervising Psychologist for the program. It was decided in that meeting, that the diagnosis of
pedophilia would be deleted from your current sex offender treatment plan. I will review your
treatment file and delete that diagnosis from your plan. Your S.O.T.P. therapist will be sending
you a written document which will identify the change.

-0729W2
(Original to inmate/ copy to level 1 grievance file)

ADDENDUM B
"Letters from the Prison"

ifSSk I State of Utat
V:>^ V*v
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor

H.L. Haun
Executive Director

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
6100 South Fashion Place Boulevard - Suite 400
Murray, Utah 84107
(801)265-5512
FAX (801) 265-5726

MEMORANDUM

To:

John Green
Administrative Coordinator

From: R. Spencer Robinson
ALJ
Re:

\'
° "

Inmate Robert Straley
USP #24725
Grievance Appeal #99D-05-30877

Date: August 23, 1999

Attached is a copy of my letter to Inmate Straley regarding grievance 99D-05-30877. The
information sent to me indicates inaccurate information was communicated to you regarding his
disciplinary case 9704281. You may wish to review what was submitted to the Board for accuracy, and
to include my letter in your records.
cc:

Inmate Straley's file

c;f-,o o f I
•C> v>.

ITCJ

n

i»-t^i

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
H.L. H a u n
Executive Director

6100 South Fashion Place Boulevard • Suite 400
Murray. Utah 84107
(801)265-5512
FAX (801) 265-5726

August 23,1999

Inmate Robert D. Straley
USP #24725
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Re: Grievance #99D-05-30877
Inmate Straley:
On August 23, 1999 I reviewed the above-noted grievance appeal. This matter deals with you
alleging case worker Douglas Mecham forged an erroneous write-up in report #9704281 (failure to take
medication to counter my claim of a shy bladder). You claim Mecham swore you had this write-up in
your jacket. You state there is no such write-up. You request that Information systems find this case;
when it is determined the case does not exist, the Douglas Mecham be reprimanded; and that the Board
be notified that false information was forwarded to them. There is no additional administrative review.
If you remain unsatisfied, you must seek a judicial remedy.
The information sent to me with your grievance shows the charges in #9704281 which resulted
in a finding of guilty were B-3-N (Possession of Contraband), as opposed to B-3-E (Creating a Health or
Safety Hazard), and B-2-0 (The Unauthorized Use of any Vehicle, Tool, Device or Object), as opposed
to B-2-Q (Failure to Take Medication as Prescribed).
You may use GRAMA to request an amendment of records to correct errors. I have sent a copy
of this letter to the Board of Pardons and Parole. I have suggested my letter be included in the Board's
file on you.

V\. ^^JUA^^W^^^R. Spencer Robinson
Administrative Law Judge
Utah Department of Corrections
cc:

John Green, Board of Pardons and Parole
Bilhe Casper
file

xsSSSifc

({Jut) st^M,
Name

^f~~

Iflil

y

MnS

€pWj&

USP ff

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\0/lj/fv
FOR
Heating Date
Hearing Type
1
le Board of Pardons decision is based on the following factors:
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON

iGRAVATING

^

fy^

MITIGATING
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND
Criminal history significantly underrepresented by guidelines
(i.e., more than k felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors)
History of similar offenses
Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses
History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . .

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities
Demonstration of extreme cruelty pr depravity
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility
Multiple incidents and/or victims
Personal gain reaped from the offense

7^
y^

OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE
Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) .
Role (organizerx leader v&. follower, minimal participant) . . _____
Obstruction of justice vs. early withdrawal or self-surrender .

>^>

VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS
Extent of injury (physical? emotional, financial, social)
Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or provoking victim
Victim in position of authority over offender

^

OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS
^
><
Denial
or minimization
acceptance
of responsibility
Repeated,
numerous v&. vg.
firstcomplete
incarceration
or parole
revocation
Extent or remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . . .
Timeliness and extent or efforts to pay restitution
Prison programming (effort to enroll, nature of prog,
programming) . ^<
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance or authority . .
Employment
possibilities
(history,
.
_
_
.
_ skills,. current job,
_ . future))
Extent of community fear, condemnation
Degree of meaningful support system
Nature and stability of release plans
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other)
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise
Lengthy history of alconol/drug abuse vs.. apparent rehabilitation.
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges • . • _
Likely release to detainer
OTHER

\Q 111/g$

VtotA/'J/jrf

ADDENDUM C
"Acknowledgment"

10/15/98
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Inmateft 24725

Inmate: Robert D. Straley

I hereby acknowledge receipt of my Board of Pardons and
Parole disclosure file.
Dated and signed this

{j?

day of October, 1998.

I witnessed that the above-named inmate accepted the Board of
Pardons and Parole disclosure file.
Dated and signed this

1998

tions' Employee

I refuse to accept my Board of Pardons and Parole
disclosure file
Dated and signed this

day of October, 1998

Inmate's Signature

USP #

Time

I witnessed that the above-named inmate refused to accept
the Board of Pardons and Parole disclosure file.
Dated and signed this

day of October, 1998.

Correct ions• Employee
Note: If you need assistance, please contact your caseworker.

ADDENDUM D
"Hearing Worksheet"

08/98 09:53 AM

KLR Page: '1
Hearing Worksheet
NAME: STRALEY, ROBERT DALE

:iS: 00071528

USP: 24725

REHEARING
USP 24725

:iS 00071528
NAME STRALEY, ROBERT DALE
tING DATE: 10/15/1998
OATH
LING OFFICIAL: Enid Pino
months

60

0 months

Staff Rec

sion:
a Under Advisement:

Explanation:

Yes

le:

Special Conditions:
Date

Month

Date

Month

Date

Month

Date

Month

iring:

.re:

>r:

//

u

'Zlu,r~L r~tW>

USP Rec

Hi? it >fc,cc

ADDENDUM E
"Decision Sheet"

/^£&
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO.
Consideration of the Status of STRALEY, ROBERT DALE

71528

PRISON NO-

24725

The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board
of Pardons on the 20th day of October, 1998, for:

REHEARING
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board
makes the following decision and order:

RESULTS
Rehearing set for 01/2001 with an
Alienist Report due prior to the hearing.
Final decision of the hearing held on
10/15/1998.

No Crime _
_
Sent Case No.
1 "
SEXUAL "ABUSE OF A "CHILD 1-15 931700103
2
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD 1-15 931700127

Judge
HALLIDAY
HALLIDAY

Expiration
01/13/2011
01/13/2011

This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at
any time until actual release from custody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
20th day of October, 1998, affixed my signature as Chairman for and
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

M. R. Sibbett, Chairman

AFFIDAVIT
of Sharel S. Reber

SHAREL S. REBER (#7966)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 140857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT DALE STRALEY,
Petitioner,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF SHAREL- S. REBER
:
:

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, and
HANK GALETKA,

Case No. 000905776
:

Judge Leslie Lewis

Respondents.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Sharel S. Reber, under oath state the following to be true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.
1.

I am a resident of the Untied States of America and the State of Utah, and I am
over the age of eighteen (18) years.

2.

I am an Assistant Attorney General employed with the Utah Attorney General's
Office, and represent the respondents in this case. I have personal knowledge of
the facts stated in this affidavit.

3.

I have reviewed petitioner's entire Board of Pardon's (Board) file in preparing
respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and accompanying memorandum.

4.

The Board's file indicates what information has been provided to an inmate in his
disclosure packet by placing a blue sheet on top of the provided information
which states, "All Materials Below This Page Were Copied and a Disclosure
Packet Prepared." The initials of the preparer and the date the materials were
prepared are also indicated on the blue sheet.

5.

Accordingly, the Board's file indicates that petitioner's disclosure packet
contained a copy of Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. The blue
sheet is initialed by "RC" on September 30, 1998.

6.

Petitioner had a hearing before the Board on October 15, 1998.

7.

C-notes from the prison are not included in the Board's file, nor are quarterly
mental health reports.

8.

As it appears in the Board's file, no medical information is attached to petitioner's
Board application.

9.

Portions of petitioner's disciplinary information are presently filed in Section 2 of

2

r\ i \ r\ r> c\

the Board's file, which ordinarily contains information not provided inmates due
to its classification under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act
(GRAMA).

DATED this J _ day of August 2000.

i-\ojl)i
SHAREL S. REBER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this

7 ^

day of August 2000.

NOTARY PUBLIC

AMY CASTERUNE
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir.
Salt U k t City, Utah $4111
My Commission Expirat
April 26,2004

(^^^LX^^^^
NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF UTAH

Residing in:

LdU M<

C/M^fyi

My Commission Expires:

H ~±l« <

3

